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ABSTRACT
METAMORPHIC WORM THAT CARRIES ITS OWN MORPHING ENGINE
by Sudarshan Madenur Sridhara
Metamorphic malware changes its internal structure across generations, but
its functionality remains unchanged. Well-designed metamorphic malware will evade
signature detection. Recent research has revealed techniques based on hidden
Markov models (HMMs) for detecting many types of metamorphic malware, as well
as techniques for evading such detection.
A worm is a type of malware that actively spreads across a network to other
host systems. In this project we design and implement a prototype metamorphic
worm that carries its own morphing engine. This is challenging, since the morphing
engine itself must be morphed across replications, which imposes significant
restrictions on the structure of the worm. Our design also employs previously
developed techniques to evade detection. We provide test results to confirm that
this worm effectively evades signature and HMM-based detection, and we consider
possible detection strategies. This worm provides a concrete example that should
prove useful for additional malware detection research.
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Metamorphism is the process of transforming a piece of software into unique
instances [20]. In metamorphic software, copies of the software are functionally
equivalent but their internal structure differs. Metamorphism is used by virus
writers to avoid detection by antivirus software which primarily use signature based
detection techniques [2].
Metamorphism provides virus writers the opportunity to develop malware
that is undetectable, with respect to static analysis [10]. Therefore, it is natural to
expect an increase in volume as well as complexity of metamorphic viruses in the
near future.
Although metamorphic viruses have been extensively studied
[1, 6, 12, 18, 25, 26, 30], a metamorphic worm presents significant challenges.
Metamorphic viruses do not need to carry their own morphing engine. In the case of
some highly metamorphic viruses, such as NGVCK [19], the metamorphic generator
is separate from the virus body.
Unlike viruses, worms are self-propagating [2], and therefore a metamorphic
worm would, most likely, need to carry its own morphing engine. Since the
morphing engine itself can act as a signature, a worm that carries its own morphing
engine must morph its own morphing engine, as well as the actual worm code,
across replications. This presents significant complications and imposes some
restrictions on the structure of the morphing engine.
In this paper, we develop and analyze a worm that carries its own morphing
engine. That is, the morphing engine morphs itself and the worm across replications.
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The resulting metamorphic worms are evaluated based on the lack of similarity
between successive generations [14] and their ability to evade detection [30].
2
CHAPTER 2
Malware types and detection techniques
Malware is a term used to refer to software with malicious functionality.
Malware can exist as an independent executable or infect a benign executable by
becoming a part of it. There are different kinds of malware, primarily distinguished
from one another by their methods of replication and infection [2].
2.1 Malware types
We discuss two of the most prominent kinds of malware: viruses and worms.
Each one of these types is explained in more detail in the sections that follow.
2.1.1 Viruses
A Virus is a malicious piece of code that tries to attach itself to other
executable code upon execution. The executable file to which the virus successfully
attaches to, is said to be “infected” [2]. Viruses employ numerous methods to
escape detection by common detection methods like signature based detection. The
most prominent methods used for this purpose are encryption, polymorphism and
metamorphism [2].
2.1.1.1 Encrypted viruses
Most of the executable portion of an encrypted virus is encrypted. A small
block of decryptor code exists in the virus to decrypt its encrypted body, when the
virus is being executed. Encryption using different keys defeats signature based
detection by not providing a common signature that can be used to detect the virus.
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However, the decryptor remains constant across generations, because of which, the
code pattern of the decryptor can be used for detection.
2.1.1.2 Polymorphic viruses
A polymorphic virus is essentially an encrypted virus which changes its
decryptor loop across generations. A polymorphic virus, theoretically, has an
infinite number of variations of the decryptor loop and therefore, has no common
part in the virus body across replications [2].
The most common method to detect polymorphic viruses is code emulation.
Although the decryptor changes across replications, the encrypted body will result
in the same block of code once decrypted. This enables in memory detection of the
virus, once the decryptor has performed the decryption.
2.1.1.3 Metamorphic viruses
Metamorphic viruses do not use encryption and decryptor functions. Instead,
the entire body of the virus is changed across generations, while retaining
functionality. This produces a new virus body for each replication.
A key component of metamorphic viruses is a mutation engine [15]. The
mutation engine is responsible for morphing the body of the metamorphic virus
across generations. The mutation engine can be independent of the resultant
metamorphic virus, or it can be stored as part of the virus body. In the former case
a higher degree of metamorphism can be achieved because the mutation engine itself
need not be morphed. In the latter case, the mutation engine itself needs to be
morphed across generations. This places restrictions on the structure of the
mutation engine, and also the level of metamorphism that can be achieved using it
[7, 28].
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Some of the morphing techniques employed by metamorphic viruses are
explained in more detail in the Chapter 3.
2.1.2 Worms
Like viruses, worms are self-replicating malware. However, there are several
characteristics that distinguish a worm from a virus.
Firstly, worms are standalone [2]. They do not rely on a host executable to
which they need to attach to. Secondly, unlike viruses which only replicate and
infect executable programs within their host machine, worms spread from host to
host across the network. Worms also operate without human intervention [22].
Similar to viruses, worms can employ different techniques to avoid signature
based detection. Polymorphism and metamorphism have been employed by worms
[3, 7].
2.2 Detection techniques
As viruses continue to evolve, there has been a corresponding evolution in
virus detection technologies as well. This section presents some techniques that
antivirus software most commonly employ. Some niche techniques are also
presented.
2.2.1 Signature-based detection
Signature-based detection is by far, the most commonly used technique for
virus detection [23]. A signature comprises of sequences of bytes extracted from a
virus, which can be used to uniquely identify the virus. A signature scanner scans
executable files for such signatures, using a database of virus signatures [2]. If a
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match occurs, the executable is assumed to be infected by the virus corresponding
to the matching signature.
Signature scanning is implemented using algorithms that can be used to scan
for a large number of signatures quickly. However, there are several drawbacks in
signature based detection. To be able to detect new virus, a signature needs to be
extracted from the virus and added to the signature database. Also, signature based
scanning is easily defeated by using techniques like polymorphism and
metamorphism [23].
2.2.2 Anomaly-based detection
Heuristic methods can be employed by anti-virus software to detect
anomalous behavior, instead of looking for specific virus signatures. Heuristic
methods can be either static or dynamic. Static heuristics involve static code
analysis to look for suspicious structures like decryption loops, self-modifying code,
use of undocumented API calls, manipulation of interrupt vectors, etc. [2, 27].
Dynamic heuristic methods determine whether an executable is infected by
analyzing its behavior while it is running. Common dynamic methods are behavior
monitoring and code emulation [27].
Anomaly-based detection systems can provide protection against zero-day
attacks by detecting even unknown viruses. However, anomaly-based detection
systems have much higher false positive and false negative rates compared to other
detection methods [9].
2.2.3 Integrity checkers
Integrity checkers detect changes to files by comparing their check-sum to
their original check-sum stored in a white list. Viruses, with very few exceptions,
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operate by changing files. Integrity checkers watch for unauthorized file
modifications to determine virus like behavior [4].
2.2.4 Hidden Markov Model based detection
Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) are statistical models, widely used in many
problems involving pattern recognition. In the past few years, considerable research
has been done on the use of Hidden Markov Models for metamorphic virus
detection. A method to detect metamorphic viruses is presented in [30]. It involves
training an HMM with opcode sequences extracted from viruses belonging to a
certain family. This trained HMM is then used to score other executable files, to
check whether they belong to the same virus family. A detailed explanation of the




The metamorphic worm described in this paper makes use of morphing
techniques like equivalent instruction substitution and dead code insertion. Apart
from these two techniques, there are a number of other morphing techniques
employed by metamorphic malware. These techniques may be as elementary as
equivalent instruction substitution, or as advanced as formal grammar mutation.
Some of the metamorphic techniques presented in [2] and [3] are explained in
this section.
3.1 Register Swap
Register swap is a simple metamorphic technique. It mutates the virus body
by swapping the operand registers with different registers. For example, POP ECX
might be replaced with POP EBX, if it is permissible. Opcode sequence remains the
same using this technique.
3.2 Subroutine permutation
In this technique changes in the structure of a virus is obtained by reordering
the virus’ subroutines. If a virus has n different subroutines, then it can generate
n-factorial different generations without repeats. Viruses which only use this
method may be detected matching multiple short signatures in the same binary. An
example of one such permutation is shown in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Subroutine permutation [24]
3.3 Garbage Instruction Insertion
Garbage instructions are instructions are of two types:
(1) Instructions that are either not executed
(2) Instructions that have no effect.
By adding garbage instructions, a virus can potentially generate an unlimited
number of unique copies. Examples of instructions that have no effect include NOP,
ADD EAX, 0, etc. Such instructions can contribute greatly to metamorphism.
3.4 Instruction substitution
This involves substituting a single instruction or a group of instructions with
another instruction or a group of instructions with the same functionality. For
instance, MOV R1, R2 is equivalent to PUSH R1 followed by POP R2.
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3.5 Transposition
Transposition involves instruction re-ordering. If instructions have no
dependency between them, their order of execution can be changed without any
change in the overall functionality of the program. For example, instructions:
1: ADD [Op1], [Op2]
2: ADD [Op3], [Op4]
can be re-ordered as shown below without any resultant change in functionality.
1: ADD [Op3], [Op4]
2: ADD [Op1], [Op2]
The same is true for groups of instructions which have no dependency on one
another. This helps to evade signature based detection, as the order of instruction
bytes change in the morphed executable.
3.6 Formal grammar mutation
Formal grammar mutation is a formalization of many existing morphing
techniques [3, 8, 31]. Classical morphing engines can be viewed as non-deterministic
automata, since transitions are possible from every symbol to every other symbol
[31], where the symbol set is the set of all possible instructions. In other words, any
instruction can be followed by any other instruction. By formalizing mutation
techniques, one can apply formal grammar rules and create viral copies with great
variation.
Figure 3.2 illustrates a simple polymorphic decryptor template and two
possible mutations of the decryptor code achieved using the formal grammar shown
10
in Figure 3.3. With this decryptor template and formal grammar combination, it is
possible to generate 960 different decryptors [31].
Figure 3.2: A simple polymorphic decryptor and two variants [31]




The ability of the metamorphic worm described in this paper to evade
signature-based detection, is evaluated by analyzing the similarity between various
generations of the worm.
4.1 N-gram similarity
In [14], an n-gram based similarity measure is proposed and analyzed. This
method can be used to compare sequences of instructions in two assembly program
files [12, 30]. This method calculates a score that represents the percentage of
similarity between the two files. The method is summarized below:
(1) Extract instruction opcodes from the two given assembly programs X and
Y. Let the length of the extracted opcode sequences from programs X and
Y be ‘m’ and ‘n’ respectively. Assign numbers in a sequence to the
extracted opcodes: 1 to the first opcode, 2 to the second opcode, etc.
(2) For all opcode sub-sequences of length three from X’s opcode sequence,
check if corresponding sub-sequences occur in the opcode sequence
extracted from Y. If a match occurs, (x, y) will be marked on a graph
where, x is the position of the first opcode of the matching sub-sequence in
Xs opcode sequence, and y is the position of the first opcode in the
matching sub-sequence in Y’s opcode sequence.
(3) After matching all opcode sequences, an m x n graph is plotted on which all
matching sub-sequences are marked. The x-axis corresponds to the opcode
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numbers extracted from X and the y-axis corresponds to the opcode
numbers extracted from Y. Retain only those line segments on the graph
whose length is above a certain threshold value (say five). This is done to
eliminate random matches and noise.
(4) Since a sequential match is done between both sequences, matching
sequences of opcodes result in line segments that are parallel to the diagonal
((0,0), (m,n)). If the matching sequence occurs in the same starting location
in both opcode sequences, the resulting line segment will fall on the
diagonal. If the matching sequence occurs at different starting locations in
both opcode sequences, the resulting line segment will be parallel to the
diagonal.
(5) For each axis, calculate the sum of the number of opcodes that are covered
by one or more of the line segments retained in (3). This sum is divided by
the total number of opcodes on the corresponding axis to find the
percentage of match for the assembly program represented by the axis. The
final similarity score is the average of the similarity percentage calculated
for both axes.
The method summarized above is illustrated graphically in Figure 4.1.
This n-gram based similarity measure is used both in [30] and [12], to compare
the similarity between assembly programs that are obtained by disassembling
benign files of viruses belonging to the NGVCK family.
An example comparison between two virus files, generated by the NGVCK
metamorphic generator [19], presented in [30] is shown in Figure 4.2. The left part
of the graph shows matching sub-sequences without eliminating noise. The right
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Figure 4.1: Similarity based on n-gram analysis [14]
part shows matching sub-sequences retained after eliminating noise. The final
similarity score in this particular instance is 21%.
Figure 4.2: n-gram similarity of two NGVCK viruses [30]
4.2 Similarity using graph technique
A method for measuring similarity between executable files using opcode
graphs is presented in [18]. This method involves creating weighted directed graphs
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using opcodes extracted from executable files. We now summarize the methods used
to generate opcode graphs, and to compute similarity using these generated graphs.
4.2.1 Opcode graphs
Each opcode that appears in an executable file’s extracted opcode sequence is
a node in the directed graph. A directed edge is inserted from this node to every
other node corresponding to the successor opcodes. Edge weights represent the
transition probabilities to successor nodes.
Counts for opcode pairs are tabulated from the extracted opcode sequence to
form a matrix. For each opcode, the counts are converted to probabilities by
dividing the count for a digram by the row sum. The resulting matrix is an opcode
graph that represents the program using which it was created.
4.2.2 Similarity Score
Let N be the number of distinct opcodes. The opcodes are mapped to
numbers 0 to N − 1. Let A and B be the opcode graphs for the executable files in
question. Elements of the matrices A and B are represented by aij and bij
respectively.










If A is the same as B, then the minimal score of 0 is obtained. On the other
hand, if aij = 1 and bik = 1 with j 6= k, the maximum possible row sum of 2 is
obtained. If this maximum row sum is obtained for each row, S(A,B) = 4.
Therefore, 0 ≤ S(A,B) ≤ 4.
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CHAPTER 5
Hidden Markov Models and virus detection
Over the past few years, there has been significant research on the use of
Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) for metamorphic virus detection
[1, 6, 12, 18, 25, 26, 30]. A method is presented in [30] in which an HMM is trained
using sequences of opcodes from viruses that belong to a particular family. This
trained HMM is then used to score binaries, to determine whether the binaries are
viruses that belong to the same family. A threshold can be obtained based on the
Log Likelihood Per Opcode (LLPO) score for viruses and benign binaries, which is
used to categorize new binaries as viruses or benign binaries based on their LLPO
score. This section explains how HMMs work and the way HMMs can be used in
virus detection.
5.1 Hidden Markov Models
A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a statistical model used to model a
Markov process whose states are unknown [21]. Some HMM notations are now
presented. The notations presented here are based on the notations used in [21]:
T → Length of the observation sequence
N → Number of states in the model
M → Number of observation symbols
Q→ {q0, q1, . . . , qN−1} − Number of observation symbols
V → {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1} − Set of possible observations
A→ state transition probabilities
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B → observation probability matrix
pi → initial state distribution
O → (O0, O1, . . . , OT−1)− observation sequence
Figure 5.1 illustrates a generic HMM. The state of the HMM and the
observation at time t are represented by Xt and Ot respectively. The initial state X0
and the A matrix determine the hidden Markov process which is represented in the
figure by the portion on top of the dotted line.
Figure 5.1: Generic Hidden Markov Model
First, the HMM is trained using input data that the HMM needs to represent.
Each individual element in the training data maps to an observation symbol.
Unique observation symbols are extracted from the set of observations. The trained
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model will then be used to determine if a given new sequence of observations is a
pattern similar to the one represented by the model.
5.1.1 An example
Here we illustrate the inner workings of an HMM using a simple example [17].
A genie is sitting behind a curtain with urns U0, U1 and U2, each containing balls
colored red, green and blue in different proportions. Balls colored red, green and
blue are indicated by R, G and B respectively. The color of the ball chosen by the
genie, at any point of time, is governed by a Markov process unknown to the
observer. The observer can only see the color of the chosen ball.
The objective is to predict the urn from which the balls are retrieved based on
the order and color of the balls drawn from them. In this example, U0, U1 and U2
are the states. The possible observations are R, G and B.
The transition probabilities from each state to every other state are










The probability of observations for each of the states is represented by the B

















The matrices pi, A and B are row-stochastic; i.e, each row sums up to 1. Each
row represents a probability distribution. Now, given a sequence of observations O
= (R, B), the objective is to find the most likely state sequence, given the model λ.
In the HMM sense, the most likely state sequence is calculated choosing the
state for which the sum of probabilities over all possible state sequences is the
highest for each observation. This process is illustrated in Table 5.1. In this case,
the optimal state sequence in the HMM sense is U0U2.
















P (U0) 0.7519 0.1335
P (U1) 0.1580 0.1843
P (U2) 0.0903 0.6824
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5.2 The three problems
The following three problems can be solved efficiently using HMMs [21].
(1) Given λ = (A, B, pi) and O, the observation sequence, find P (O|λ).
(2) Given λ = (A, B, pi) and O, the observation sequence, find the optimal
state sequence for the Markov process.
(3) Given O, the number of unique symbols M and the number of states N ,
find λ.
Problem 1 involves to determining the likelihood of an observation sequence
using the model. Problem 2 deals with uncovering the “hidden” part of the HMM.
Problem 3 deals with training the HMM using the given observation sequence O
and the parameters M and N .
In this paper we will be dealing with problem 1 and 3. We will make use of
methods to solve problem 3 to train a HMM using opcode sequences extracted from
executable files. Scoring opcode sequences to be tested using this model involves
solving problem 1. We will not be dealing with problem 2, as previous research
indicates that the meaning of the HMM states themselves has not been of much
consequence to the detection capability of the HMM [12, 30].
5.2.1 Forward Algorithm
The forward algorithm or α pass is used to determine P (O|λ).
For t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 and i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, define
αt(i) = P (O0, O1, . . . , Ot, xt = qi|λ)
The probability of the partial observation sequence up to time t is αt(i).
Using the forward algorithm, P (O|λ) can be computed as shown below:
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(1) Let α0(i) = piibi(O0), for i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1.













Backward algorithm or β pass can be used to determine the most likely state
sequence.
For t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 and i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, define
βt(i) = P (Ot+1, Ot+2, . . . , OT−1|xt = qi, λ)
Then, βt(i) can be computed efficiently as shown below:
(1) Let βT−1(i) = 1, for i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1.





For t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 2 and i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, define
γt(i) = P (xt = qi|O, λ).
Since the relevant probability up to time t is measured by αt(i), and the




From the definition of γt(i), the most likely state at any time t is the state for
which γt(i) is maximum.
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5.2.3 Baum-Welch Algorithm
This algorithm adjusts model parameters to best-fit the observations. The
number of states N and the number of unique observations symbols M are fixed.
However, the contents of the A, B and pi are free, subject only to the row stochastic
condition. The re-estimation process is explained below:
(1) Initialize λ = (A,B, pi) with an approximate guess. If no such guess is
possible, use random values. For example pii = 1/N, Aij = 1/N, Bij = 1/M.
(2) Compute αt(i), βt(i), γt(i) and γt(i, j) where γt(i, j) is a di-gamma.









(3) Re-estimate model parameters as follows: For i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 let
pii = γ0(i)
















(4) If P (O|λ) increases, go to step 3.
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5.3 HMMs and Virus detection
The use of HMMs for metamorphic virus detection is explained in great detail
in [29, 30]. The basic objective is to train an HMM using opcodes extracted from
viruses belonging to a particular family. The trained HMM will, in effect, represent
the statistical properties of the virus family. Using this trained HMM, we can
compute a score for any given program to determine how “close” the file is to the
virus family that the HMM represents. We can then classify the file based on a
predetermined threshold.
First, a collection of viruses belonging to the same family are disassembled.
From each of the disassembled files, only the instruction opcodes are extracted. An
example of extracted opcodes is shown in Figure 5.2. Opcodes sequences extracted
from all the virus files are concatenated. This concatenated sequence forms the
sequence observations used to train an HMM. The set of unique opcodes in the
observation sequence is the set of distinct observation symbols.
An HMM is now trained using this sequence of observations, as explained in
Section 5.1.1. To detect whether a given program belongs to the virus family, this
trained HMM is used to calculate the Log Likelihood per Opcode (LLPO). If the
LLPO of the program is within a particular threshold, the file is classified as
belonging to the virus family. We now take a briefly look at what Log Likelihood
Per Opcode means.
5.3.1 Log Likelihood Per Opcode
Scoring observation sequences and training the HMM involves computation of
product of probabilities. The result of multiplication tends to 0 exponentially as T
increases. As a result, the use of methods described in Section 5.2 inevitably results
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Figure 5.2: Extracted opcode sequence
in underflow. To avoid this problem, the forward and backward algorithms
normalize the result of each iteration. This process is called scaling. HMM scaling is
explained in detail in [21].
Once scaling is employed, P (O|λ) is redefined as:




where cj is the scaling factor at time j. However, this computation is also
susceptible to underflow and to avoid that, we compute:




This is the log likelihood. Log likelihood is length dependent, as the sum of
log transition probabilities and log observation probabilities will be higher for a
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longer sequence. As the sequences in the test set may be of different lengths
compared to the sequences used to train the model, log likelihood is divided by the
number of opcodes in the sequence to obtain Log Likelihood Per Opcode which
accounts for the length difference [30].
5.3.2 Effectiveness of HMM detection
HMM detection has proven to be very effective in detection of highly
metamorphic viruses [30]. Experiments with HMM detection in [29] indicate a
detection rate of about 90% and a false positive rate of less than 10%.
5.4 Evading HMM detection
There has been some research on methods to evade HMM detection [12]. The
method presented in [12] involves inserting dead code from the benign files in the
test set, into the virus files. This helps in making the virus files statistically similar
to normal files. This is achieved by making use of a dynamic scoring algorithm
which inserts a block of dead code only if it results in the virus file becoming more
similar [14] to normal files.
Results presented in [11] indicate that, with an increase in the amount of dead
code inserted from normal files, the average LLPO scores for viruses and normal
files become closer. The HMM-detector showed indications of failing when 5% of the
subroutines were copied from the normal file. The LLPO scores for viruses and
normal files were the closest when 35% dead blocks and 30% subroutines were
copied from normal files.
Results in [11] also indicate that inserting long sequences of opcodes, like
subroutines, are more effective in defeating HMM detection than randomly inserted
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blocks of dead code. The worm presented in this paper makes use of this result




We have implemented a metamorphic worm that carries its own morphing
engine. As mentioned above, this presents a significant challenge since both the
worm body and the morphing engine itself must be morphed. This section presents
the structure of our metamorphic worm in detail.
6.1 Structure
Figure 6.1 illustrates the structure of the various components of the worm.
The worm consists of the following:
(1) Body - This is the central component that controls the worm’s life cycle. It
controls and coordinates the activities of all the other active components of
the worm.
(2) Disassembler - Disassembles the binary portion of the worm and extracts
instructions from it.
(3) Morphing Engine - The morphing engine operates on the set of
disassembled instructions. It removes old dead code instructions, adds new
dead code and employs equivalent instruction substitution.
(4) Reassembler - The reassembler re-structures the control flow in the morphed
body of code and converts the morphed body to binary.
(5) Payload - This is the actual piece of code the worm is intended to run on
every computer it infects. In our case, the payload is benign; it simply
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appends a line of text to a temporary file.
(6) Pad block 1 and Pad block 2 (Padding blocks) - These are blocks of dead
code that are replaced from generation to generation. The purpose of doing
this is to make the worm statistically similar to normal files and thereby
evade HMM detection. The blocks also help to avoid relocating sections and
other book-keeping information in the executable from generation to
generation [12].
Figure 6.1: Metamorphic worm components
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6.2 Memory Layout
We now examine the layout of different components of the worm in the
address space of the worm’s process. The placement of the worm in memory is
illustrated in Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: Metamorphic worm memory layout
6.3 Metamorphic techniques used
The worm uses two of the metamorphic techniques described in Chapter 3.
Specifically, the worm uses equivalent instruction substitution and garbage code
insertion.
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6.3.1 Equivalent instruction substitution
The primary candidates for morphing are the MOV and the XOR instructions.
The former because, it appears in abundance in binaries, and the latter because it is
a usual candidate for substituting the MOV instruction and hence needs to be
substituted back.
After the disassembler has disassembled the worm-portion of the worm’s
executable image, the instructions are scanned for possible equivalent instructions
to be substituted, by the morphing engine. These instructions are substituted by
equivalent instructions with a fixed probability. This is achieved using a
substitution table as shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Equivalent instruction table
Instruction Equivalent Action
0x48 0x89 0xc3 0x48 0x31 0xdb 0x48 0x01 0xc3 NULL
0x48 0x89 0xc1 0x48 0x31 0xc9 0x48 0x01 0xc1 NULL
. . .
The first column of each of the first two rows in Table 6.1 correspond to
instructions MOV %RAX,%RBX and MOV %RAX,%RCX respectively. The second column
of the first two rows correspond to instructions XOR %RBX,%RBX; ADD %RAX,%RBX
and XOR %RBX,%RCX; ADD %RAX,%RCX respectively. The “Action” field in table is
the address of a label inside the morphing function which performs actions specific
to the instructions that were substituted. It is NULL if no specific action is necessary.
A complete list of equivalent instructions that are substituted by the
morphing engine is in Appendix A.
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6.3.2 Dead code insertion
Dead instruction insertion involves inserting instructions which do not result
in any change in data, or the contents of general purpose registers. The sole purpose
of adding these instructions is to increase the diversity of instructions.
However, the effect of such instructions on the RFLAGS register should be
carefully considered as they might have adverse effects on control flow. Control flow
instructions use bits in the RFLAGS register to decide which code path to take. If a
dead code instruction which manipulates RFLAGS is inserted before a control flow
instruction, it can have an adverse effect on the result of executing the next control
flow instruction.
Examples for dead code instructions include ADD $0x0,%RAX, SUB $0x0,%RBX,
XOR $0x0,%RAX, etc. The complete list of dead code instructions used by the worm
is in Appendix B.
6.4 Functionality
A characteristic feature of metamorphic malware which carry their own engine
is that the actual “payload” part of the worm will be much smaller than the overall
size of the worm. In the case of our worm, the payload is benign and merely
appends some text to the end of a temporary file. The worm’s functionality is
summarized by the Algorithm below:
Run ‘‘payload’’ // Actual intent of the worm
Open own binary image from disk by reading /proc/self/exe
Read worm data and book-keeping data from its ‘‘.data’’ section
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Disassemble worm body excluding padding blocks:
For each disassembled instruction:
Add a unique label and store virtual address
Build symbol table:
For each disassembled instruction INS:
if control flow instruction
add (INS.label, INS.target.label) to symbol table
Morph:
Initialize substitution and dead code instruction tables
For each disassembled instruction INS:
if INS is a dead instruction:
if INS is a control flow target
(determined from symbol table)
Change target to the next disassembled instruction
Ignore dead instruction
// Probability to insert dead code instruction = 0.33
if adding new dead code instruction:
choose dead code instruction randomly from table
add new dead code instruction to morphed
instruction list
// Probability to morph an existing instruction
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// if possible, is 0.33
If morphing:
Check substitution table for a suitable entry
if valid entry exists:




Fix control flow in list of morphed instructions
Patch new binary:
Replace padding blocks from benign binaries
Create a new binary image
Write binary to disk
Propogate:
// This is for completeness only. A real worm uses exploits
‘‘rcp’’ or ‘‘scp’’ the new binary image to surrounding IP
addresses
6.5 Implementation
The worm is implemented to work on Linux on the Intel x86 64 architecture.
The programming language used to implement the worm is C. The compiler used to
build the worm is GCC, version 4.6.2 build 20111027 and the resulting format of the
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executable image of the worm is ELF64. This section explains implementation
details such as layout of the worm’s executable image, libraries used by the worm,
etc.
6.5.1 Libraries used
The worm only links directly to libc and libdl. The libraries dynamically
loaded during run-time are libbfd and libopdis. Libraries libc and libdl are part of
the core of any Linux distribution. Libbfd is part of the GNU Binutils [13] package,
and is usually found on most of the Linux distributions. Libopdis is an independent
library licensed under GNU LGPL as of version 1.0.4 [16]. Libopdis extends the
libopcodes library [13] by offering algorithms for linear and control-flow disassembly,




The effectiveness of the worm is evaluated using n-gram similarity [14],
similarity using graph technique [18] and HMM based detection [30].
For the worm to be effective in evading signature based detection, the worm
bodies in different generations of worm files must not be too similar to one another.
At the same time, the worm files must be similar to benign files so that they are not
easily distinguishable from benign files based on a similarity threshold [18].
An effective means of evading HMM based detection is to make the worms
statistically similar to benign binaries. This achieved by using long sequences of
instructions from benign executable files to fill the worm’s padding blocks. This is
in line with the HMM evasion technique [12] discussed in Section 5.4.
7.1 Test data
For each experiment, 100 generations of the worm are generated and 20 benign
files are selected. The list of benign files, and their corresponding file IDs used in
our test cases are shown in Table 7.1. From the 100 worms, 80 worms are chosen to
train the HMM. The remaining 20 worms and benign files are scored using the
trained HMM. The worm files in the test set are named MWOR 0, MWOR 1, . . .,
MWOR 19. The benign files are named BEN 0, BEN 1, . . ., BEN 19.
The padding blocks of the MWOR files are randomly chosen blocks of code
from one or more of the BEN files. Replacing the padding block randomly from the
chosen benign file set in Table 7.1 is part of the worm’s functionality.
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Table 7.1: Mapping from Benign file ID to actual executable file






















As part of the experiment, both n-gram and graph technique are used to
measure similarity between worms, between worms and benign files, and between
benign files. An HMM classifier trained using worm files in the training set, is used
to score benign files and worm files in the test set.
7.2 N-gram Similarity
The n-gram similarity technique [14] explained in Section 4.1 is used to
measure similarity between opcode sequences extracted from different generations of
the worm and from benign executable files. Since the objective here is to assess
whether common signatures can be extracted from worm executable files, the
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padding blocks are excluded from the assessment. When comparing these worm
bodies to benign files, a representative sample sequence of instructions, of length
equal to that of the worm body is chosen from the benign files.
Table 7.2 lists the similarity scores between consecutive generations of the
worm. The average similarity is 19.09%. Similarly, Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 list the
similarity scores between worms and benign files, and between worm files
respectively. The average similarity between worms and benign files is 13.98%, while
the average similarity between benign files is 26.35%.
Table 7.2: Similarity between MWOR files
File 1 File 2 Similarity File 1 File 2 Similarity
MWOR 0 MWOR 1 0.209329 MWOR 10 MWOR 11 0.167043
MWOR 1 MWOR 2 0.139122 MWOR 11 MWOR 12 0.220303
MWOR 2 MWOR 3 0.199484 MWOR 12 MWOR 13 0.170271
MWOR 3 MWOR 4 0.21417 MWOR 13 MWOR 14 0.142834
MWOR 4 MWOR 5 0.222563 MWOR 14 MWOR 15 0.133796
MWOR 5 MWOR 6 0.526146 MWOR 15 MWOR 16 0.179309
MWOR 6 MWOR 7 0.206423 MWOR 16 MWOR 17 0.120562
MWOR 7 MWOR 8 0.225307 MWOR 17 MWOR 18 0.133473
MWOR 8 MWOR 9 0.133635 MWOR 18 MWOR 19 0.126372
MWOR 9 MWOR 10 0.15623
Mean: 0.190862
Variance: 0.007521
The similarity between worm generations can also be visualized graphically as
explained in Section 4. The similarity between the first and second generations of
the worm is illustrated by the graph in Figure 7.1. Examples of the other graphs
depicting the similarity between other consecutive pairs of worms are included in
Appendix C.
The n-gram similarity between worms, is somewhat lower than the similarity
between benign files. This can be attributed to the fact that, only the worm body is
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Table 7.3: Similarity between MWOR and benign files
File 1 File 2 Similarity File 1 File 2 Similarity
MWOR 0 BEN 0 0.203112 MWOR 10 BEN 10 0.234278
MWOR 1 BEN 1 0.118454 MWOR 11 BEN 11 0.130494
MWOR 2 BEN 2 0.178677 MWOR 12 BEN 12 0.125905
MWOR 3 BEN 3 0.105231 MWOR 13 BEN 13 0.141814
MWOR 4 BEN 4 0.17498 MWOR 14 BEN 14 0.068771
MWOR 5 BEN 5 0.121704 MWOR 15 BEN 15 0.050677
MWOR 6 BEN 6 0.133385 MWOR 16 BEN 16 0.123899
MWOR 7 BEN 7 0.169622 MWOR 17 BEN 17 0.118309
MWOR 8 BEN 8 0.152165 MWOR 18 BEN 18 0.181743
MWOR 9 BEN 9 0.13086 MWOR 19 BEN 19 0.131365
Mean: 0.139772
Variance: 0.001732
Table 7.4: Similarity between BEN files
File 1 File 2 Similarity File 1 File 2 Similarity
BEN 0 BEN 1 0.223816 BEN 10 BEN 11 0.212141
BEN 1 BEN 2 0.176202 BEN 11 BEN 12 0.213142
BEN 2 BEN 3 0.309048 BEN 12 BEN 13 0.399767
BEN 3 BEN 4 0.248399 BEN 13 BEN 14 0.249333
BEN 4 BEN 5 0.196715 BEN 14 BEN 15 0.190627
BEN 5 BEN 6 0.227521 BEN 15 BEN 16 0.450179
BEN 6 BEN 7 0.199912 BEN 16 BEN 17 0.215491
BEN 7 BEN 8 0.240475 BEN 17 BEN 18 0.412275
BEN 8 BEN 9 0.248165 BEN 18 BEN 19 0.327552
BEN 9 BEN 10 0.265344
Mean: 0.263479
Variance: 0.006037
considered for similarity tests, rather than the whole worm. The same is true in the
case of worms versus benign files. The initial sections of the benign files, which are
not morphed, result in a higher similarity between benign files, as opposed to worm
versus benign files. However, low similarity of the worm body between different
generations of the worm, helps evade signature based detection.
38
Figure 7.1: Similarity graph MWOR 0 vs MWOR 1
7.3 Similarity using graph technique
The graph technique to measure similarity [18] explained in Section 4.2 is used
to measure similarity between complete worm executable files, including padding
blocks. It is also used to compare the similarities between pairs benign files, and
pairs of worm files and benign files.
Figure 7.2 illustrates the similarity between worm files, benign files, and worm
and benign file pairs. The average similarity score for pairs of worm files is 0.592744.
The average similarity score for pairs of worms and benign files is 0.565945. The
average similarity score for pairs of benign files is 0.667563. As indicated by the
similarity scores in Figure 7.2, it is clear that it is not possible to obtain a threshold
that can be used to distinguish between the worm files and benign files.
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Figure 7.2: Similarity using graph technique
Table 7.5 lists the similarity scores between consecutive generations of the
worm. Similarly, Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 list the similarity scores between worms
and benign files, and between worm files respectively.
7.4 HMM
We now analyze the results of running the HMM detector on test data. As
indicated by previous research [12, 30], the number of states in the HMM does not
significantly impact the accuracy of classifier. Consequently, in this chapter, we will
only consider HMMs with two hidden states. Additional results for HMMs with
three states are presented in Appendix D.
The ratio of dead-code to worm-code, called the “padding-ratio”, is the ratio
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Table 7.5: Similarity using graph technique - MWOR files
File 1 File 2 Similarity File 1 File 2 Similarity
MWOR 0 MWOR 1 0.831699 MWOR 10 MWOR 11 0.64038
MWOR 1 MWOR 2 0.548553 MWOR 11 MWOR 12 0.41586
MWOR 2 MWOR 3 0.622553 MWOR 12 MWOR 13 0.638838
MWOR 3 MWOR 4 0.667299 MWOR 13 MWOR 14 0.698381
MWOR 4 MWOR 5 0.424688 MWOR 14 MWOR 15 0.727753
MWOR 5 MWOR 6 0.428372 MWOR 15 MWOR 16 0.355481
MWOR 6 MWOR 7 0.504638 MWOR 16 MWOR 17 0.487425
MWOR 7 MWOR 8 0.78983 MWOR 17 MWOR 18 0.540405
MWOR 8 MWOR 9 0.761414 MWOR 18 MWOR 19 0.523221
MWOR 9 MWOR 10 0.655345
Mean: 0.592744
Variance: 0.017882
Table 7.6: Similarity using graph technique - MWOR and BEN files
File 1 File 2 Similarity File 1 File 2 Similarity
MWOR 0 BEN 0 0.880288 MWOR 10 BEN 10 0.433276
MWOR 1 BEN 1 0.502868 MWOR 11 BEN 11 0.615871
MWOR 2 BEN 2 0.661706 MWOR 12 BEN 12 0.381922
MWOR 3 BEN 3 0.565231 MWOR 13 BEN 13 0.558548
MWOR 4 BEN 4 0.957393 MWOR 14 BEN 14 0.34732
MWOR 5 BEN 5 0.373347 MWOR 15 BEN 15 0.761746
MWOR 6 BEN 6 0.660952 MWOR 16 BEN 16 0.665618
MWOR 7 BEN 7 0.413928 MWOR 17 BEN 17 0.455879
MWOR 8 BEN 8 0.618177 MWOR 18 BEN 18 0.675529
MWOR 9 BEN 9 0.437322 MWOR 19 BEN 19 0.35198
Mean: 0.565945
Variance: 0.028684
of number of dead code instructions in the worm to the number of instructions that
correspond to the worm’s functionality. For example, a worm with twice as much
dead code as worm instructions will have a padding-ratio of 2.
We use an HMM with two states to score worms with padding ratio: 0.5, 1,
1.5, 2, 2.5, 3 and 4. Using these scores, we analyze the padding-ratio for which the
HMM detector starts to falter.
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Table 7.7: Similarity using graph technique - BEN files
File 1 File 2 Similarity File 1 File 2 Similarity
BEN 0 BEN 1 0.527698 BEN 10 BEN 11 0.528616
BEN 1 BEN 2 0.665027 BEN 11 BEN 12 0.693015
BEN 2 BEN 3 0.601069 BEN 12 BEN 13 0.462323
BEN 3 BEN 4 1.295305 BEN 13 BEN 14 0.261346
BEN 4 BEN 5 0.998744 BEN 14 BEN 15 0.696717
BEN 5 BEN 6 0.936357 BEN 15 BEN 16 0.802703
BEN 6 BEN 7 1.00245 BEN 16 BEN 17 0.787582
BEN 7 BEN 8 0.770225 BEN 17 BEN 18 0.318344
BEN 8 BEN 9 0.559742 BEN 18 BEN 19 0.500018
BEN 9 BEN 10 0.276418
Mean: 0.667563
Variance: 0.068312
Figure 7.3 shows the result of scoring worms and benign files that are part of
the test data, using an HMM with two states. In this case, the generated worms
contain half as much dead code as the instructions that constitute the core
functionality of the worm.
Figure 7.3: HMM with N = 2, padding-ratio: 0.5
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The Log Likelihood Per Opcode (LLPO) scores for each of the MWOR files
and BEN files are shown in Table 7.8.
Table 7.8: LLPO scores - padding-ratio: 0.5, N=2
File LLPO File LLPO
BEN 0 -2.887989 MWOR 0 -2.462167
BEN 1 -2.953637 MWOR 1 -2.409931
BEN 2 -3.254619 MWOR 2 -2.447955
BEN 3 -2.955244 MWOR 3 -2.614725
BEN 4 -2.933179 MWOR 4 -2.604744
BEN 5 -2.93336 MWOR 5 -2.488717
BEN 6 -2.930817 MWOR 6 -2.491995
BEN 7 -3.248653 MWOR 7 -2.448593
BEN 8 -2.864609 MWOR 8 -2.501309
BEN 9 -2.993974 MWOR 9 -2.575815
BEN 10 -3.063865 MWOR 10 -2.388594
BEN 11 -2.868419 MWOR 11 -2.456711
BEN 12 -2.898413 MWOR 12 -2.471223
BEN 13 -2.784516 MWOR 13 -2.424988
BEN 14 -2.934695 MWOR 14 -2.502634
BEN 15 -3.044624 MWOR 15 -2.488669
BEN 16 -2.91717 MWOR 16 -2.493647
BEN 17 -2.758506 MWOR 17 -2.385327
BEN 18 -2.859302 MWOR 18 -2.381464
BEN 19 -2.890073 MWOR 19 -2.515267
Figure 7.4 shows the scores for a padding-ratio of 2.5. The increase in
padding-ratio causes the LLPO scores of the worms to be closer to that of benign
binaries.
The same test is repeated for other padding ratios. The results of the test are
summarized in the ROC curve shown in Figure 7.5. The area under the curve
(AUC) is equal to the probability that a classifier will rank a randomly chosen
positive instance higher than a randomly chosen negative one [5].
The AUC and standard error for each of the curves in the graph is shown in
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Figure 7.4: HMM with N = 2, padding-ratio 2.5
Figure 7.5: ROC Curves for different padding-ratios
Table 7.9. For a padding-ratio of 2.5, the area under the curve is 0.8325. At this
point the it is safe to assume the HMM detector starts misclassifying files with some
probability.
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Table 7.9: ROC AUC statistics for different padding-ratios











The metamorphic worm described in this paper makes use of two morphing
techniques: equivalent instruction substitution and dead instruction insertion. This
is done in order to defeat signature-based detection. The worm also uses blocks of
dead code from benign executable files to evade HMM detection. This also helps in
making the worm executable files similar to benign executable files.
Results from the experiments show that it is not possible to obtain useful
detection results using an HMM-based detector when the added dead code is more
than 2.5 times the worm code. The HMM detector’s performance is acceptable for
padding-ratios up to 2.0. However, the probability of misclassification starts
increasing for padding-ratios 2.5 and above, as indicated by the ROC curves.
We measured similarity using n-gram technique and graph technique between
various combinations of benign executable files and worm files. The n-gram
similarity between worm bodies in different generations of the worm, is sufficiently
low to avoid extraction of a common signature, which can be used for
signature-based detection.
The average similarity scores measured using graph technique, between worm
file pairs, and between worm file and benign file pairs, are comparable to the
similarity scores of benign file pairs. Therefore, the worms cannot be distinguished




One of the main techniques used by the metamorphic worm described in this
paper, is garbage instruction insertion. Use of garbage instructions is a proven
technique to defeat the HMM detector [12]. However, the instructions are inserted
randomly at feasible places and can be separated using more advanced
dead-instruction finding tools. Further research can be done on such tools which can
effectively detect functionally equivalent blocks of dead code.
Further research needs to be done on evaluating the effectiveness of
HMM-based detectors, when compiler generated blocks of non-functional code are
used for morphing.
The worm also uses simple morphing techniques. Further research can be
carried out on morphing engines which use more advanced morphing techniques,
while retaining the ability to be carried along with the malware.
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APPENDIX A
Equivalent instructions used by the worm
Table A.1: Equivalent instructions used by the worm
No. Instruction Equivalent instruction(s)





2 MOV %REG1, %REG2 XOR %REG2, %REG2
ADD %REG1, %REG2
3 MOV %REG1, (%REG2) MOV $0, (%REG2)
ADD %REG1, (%REG2)
4 MOV IMM, (%REG) MOV $0, (%REG2)
ADD IMM, (%REG2)
5 XOR %REG, %REG MOV $0, %REG
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APPENDIX B
Dead code instructions used by the worm
Table B.1: Dead code instructions used by the worm
No. Instruction
1 ADD $0, %RAX
2 ADD $0, %RBX
3 ADD $0, %RCX
4 ADD $0, %RDX
5 SUB $0, %RAX
6 SUB $0, %RBX
7 SUB $0, %RCX
8 SUB $0, %RDX
9 XOR $0, %RAX
10 XOR $0, %RBX
11 XOR $0, %RCX
12 XOR $0, %RDX
13 AND %RAX, %RAX
14 AND %RBX, %RBX
15 AND %RCX, %RCX




Figure C.1: Similarity graph - MWOR 1 vs MWOR 2
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Figure C.2: Similarity graph - MWOR 2 vs MWOR 3
Figure C.3: Similarity graph - MWOR 3 vs MWOR 4
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Figure C.4: Similarity graph - MWOR 4 vs MWOR 5
Figure C.5: Similarity graph - MWOR 5 vs MWOR 6
55




• HMM parameters: N = 3, M = 131
• Worm to padding ratio: 2.0
• LLPO scores: Table D.1
• Lowest MWOR file LLPO: -2.555177
• Highest BEN file LLPO: -2.479824
• Graph: Figure D.1
Figure D.1: HMM with N = 3, worm-padding ratio 2.0
(1) HMM parameters: N = 3, M = 129
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(2) Worm to padding ratio: 3.0
(3) LLPO scores: Table D.2
(4) Lowest MWOR file LLPO: -2.541051
(5) Highest BEN file LLPO: -2.451643
(6) Graph: Figure D.2
Figure D.2: HMM with N = 3, worm-padding ratio 3.0
(1) HMM parameters: N = 3, M = 131
(2) Worm to padding ratio: 4.0
(3) LLPO scores: Table D.3
(4) Lowest MWOR file LLPO: -2.718673
(5) Highest BEN file LLPO: -2.451643
(6) Graph: Figure D.3
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Figure D.3: HMM with N = 3, worm-padding ratio 4.0
Table D.1: LLPO scores - Worm-padding ratio: 2.0, N=3
File LLPO File LLPO
File LLPO File LLPO
BEN 0 -2.599386 MWOR 0 -2.512852
BEN 1 -2.684883 MWOR 1 -2.529261
BEN 2 -2.907455 MWOR 2 -2.499819
BEN 3 -2.657581 MWOR 3 -2.555177
BEN 4 -2.661491 MWOR 4 -2.492141
BEN 5 -2.655631 MWOR 5 -2.456433
BEN 6 -2.674456 MWOR 6 -2.425267
BEN 7 -2.900707 MWOR 7 -2.470162
BEN 8 -2.585162 MWOR 8 -2.47152
BEN 9 -2.709333 MWOR 9 -2.37629
BEN 10 -2.756476 MWOR 10 -2.427578
BEN 11 -2.573857 MWOR 11 -2.412057
BEN 12 -2.613086 MWOR 12 -2.383274
BEN 13 -2.508351 MWOR 13 -2.381367
BEN 14 -2.615704 MWOR 14 -2.511594
BEN 15 -2.748886 MWOR 15 -2.42333
BEN 16 -2.603163 MWOR 16 -2.477987
BEN 17 -2.479824 MWOR 17 -2.49241
BEN 18 -2.579598 MWOR 18 -2.427912
BEN 19 -2.613378 MWOR 19 -2.533057
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Table D.2: LLPO scores - Worm-padding ratio: 3.0, N=3
File LLPO File LLPO
BEN 0 -2.544323 MWOR 0 -2.402998
BEN 1 -2.64357 MWOR 1 -2.486666
BEN 2 -2.843443 MWOR 2 -2.504983
BEN 3 -2.608455 MWOR 3 -2.541051
BEN 4 -2.625266 MWOR 4 -2.4218
BEN 5 -2.619258 MWOR 5 -2.517544
BEN 6 -2.62047 MWOR 6 -2.382393
BEN 7 -2.84105 MWOR 7 -2.395489
BEN 8 -2.515048 MWOR 8 -2.49441
BEN 9 -2.669118 MWOR 9 -2.393952
BEN 10 -2.689387 MWOR 10 -2.380322
BEN 11 -2.526972 MWOR 11 -2.444773
BEN 12 -2.576147 MWOR 12 -2.421168
BEN 13 -2.478839 MWOR 13 -2.325241
BEN 14 -2.567223 MWOR 14 -2.527484
BEN 15 -2.690124 MWOR 15 -2.453113
BEN 16 -2.558649 MWOR 16 -2.353091
BEN 17 -2.451643 MWOR 17 -2.486506
BEN 18 -2.515152 MWOR 18 -2.45853
BEN 19 -2.560068 MWOR 19 -2.434684
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Table D.3: LLPO scores - Worm-padding ratio: 4.0, N=3
File LLPO File LLPO
BEN 0 -2.563521 MWOR 0 -2.478913
BEN 1 -2.652861 MWOR 1 -2.569835
BEN 2 -2.87828 MWOR 2 -2.502876
BEN 3 -2.606329 MWOR 3 -2.440894
BEN 4 -2.639205 MWOR 4 -2.326988
BEN 5 -2.633219 MWOR 5 -2.557039
BEN 6 -2.650461 MWOR 6 -2.465314
BEN 7 -2.878112 MWOR 7 -2.497504
BEN 8 -2.54517 MWOR 8 -2.391017
BEN 9 -2.665605 MWOR 9 -2.486907
BEN 10 -2.717854 MWOR 10 -2.448817
BEN 11 -2.543789 MWOR 11 -2.511273
BEN 12 -2.579349 MWOR 12 -2.522425
BEN 13 -2.477433 MWOR 13 -2.495827
BEN 14 -2.569425 MWOR 14 -2.392941
BEN 15 -2.714744 MWOR 15 -2.411323
BEN 16 -2.562329 MWOR 16 -2.718673
BEN 17 -2.455398 MWOR 17 -2.545033
BEN 18 -2.546387 MWOR 18 -2.552821




Table E.1: HMM matrices, N = 2 Worm-padding ratio: 2.0
HMM Parameters
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Table E.2: HMM matrices, N = 3 Worm-padding ratio: 2.0
HMM Parameters








adc 0.0000828834 0.0000105444 0.0000000000
add 0.0234782893 0.0912150386 0.1570662990
addsd 0.0001345659 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
addss 0.0001217501 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
and 0.0085665320 0.0350832625 0.0589494082
bsf 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0001617223
bsr 0.0000128158 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
bswap 0.0000000000 0.0000025526 0.0000000000
bt 0.0000580231 0.0000000000 0.0002759692
call 0.0104884193 0.0033310490 0.5345897198
cdqe 0.0001669943 0.0083739393 0.0007661987
clc 0.0000000000 0.0000076578 0.0000000000
cld 0.0000000000 0.0000051052 0.0000000000
cmova 0.0002531120 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cmovae 0.0002070472 0.0000035163 0.0000000000
cmovb 0.0002531120 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cmovbe 0.0000776469 0.0000530054 0.0000000000
cmove 0.0029079862 0.0002511113 0.0000000000
cmovg 0.0001323610 0.0000272827 0.0000000000
cmovge 0.0000833027 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cmovl 0.0000532171 0.0000061011 0.0000000000
cmovle 0.0000707234 0.0000049168 0.0000000000
cmovne 0.0014605853 0.0001356193 0.0000000000
cmovns 0.0000701355 0.0000385690 0.0000000000
cmovs 0.0001431256 0.0000008383 0.0000000000
cmp 0.1070266756 0.0000000000 0.0301889020
cpuid 0.0000287684 0.0000000000 0.0003467898
cvtsi2sd 0.0002114607 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cvtsi2ss 0.0002242765 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cvttsd2si 0.0000128158 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cvttss2si 0.0000704869 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cwde 0.0000000000 0.0000740255 0.0000000000
dec 0.0000099010 0.0003105508 0.0002685659
div 0.0000336322 0.0000000000 0.0024894014
divsd 0.0000582197 0.0000046682 0.0000000000
divss 0.0000096118 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
enter 0.0000000000 0.0000510520 0.0000000000
fcmovnb 0.0000000000 0.0000076578 0.0000000000
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table E.2 – Continued
HMM Parameters
fild 0.0000000000 0.0000153156 0.0000000000
fisttp 0.0000010288 0.0000152854 0.0001581495
fld 0.0000128158 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
fmul 0.0000000000 0.0000229734 0.0000000000
fstp 0.0000071958 0.0000095827 0.0000000000
fsub 0.0000032039 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
fucomip 0.0000064079 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
fxch 0.0000064079 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
hlt 0.0000640790 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
icebp 0.0000000000 0.0000484994 0.0000000000
idiv 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0007970598
imul 0.0006132673 0.0015983244 0.0006981240
in 0.0000167522 0.0000453633 0.0000000000
inc 0.0000835692 0.0000559938 0.0003232233
ja 0.0074812232 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jae 0.0037870689 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jb 0.0044663063 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jbe 0.0057863337 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
je 0.1074893184 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jg 0.0042067863 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jge 0.0008466299 0.0000274515 0.0000000000
jl 0.0023132519 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jle 0.0068468411 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jmp 0.0656506094 0.0116690931 0.0773728756
jne 0.0648863953 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jnp 0.0000096118 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jns 0.0007665269 0.0002316631 0.0000000000
jo 0.0000001864 0.0000177197 0.0000000000
jp 0.0000096118 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
js 0.0032007460 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
ldmxcsr 0.0000032039 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
lea 0.0159713702 0.0362829569 0.0018943892
leave 0.0005994922 0.0000000000 0.0012809520
lock 0.0000051874 0.0000397825 0.0002402252
lods 0.0000000000 0.0000025526 0.0000000000
loop 0.0000000000 0.0000102104 0.0000000000
loope 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0005313732
loopne 0.0000042639 0.0000884966 0.0000000000
mov 0.2228118157 0.6235781612 0.0430640170
movabs 0.0007338803 0.0002167839 0.0005893452
movapd 0.0000480592 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
movaps 0.0031142394 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
movs 0.0000000000 0.0000002543 0.0002760874
movsd 0.0002950718 0.0002830931 0.0000000000
movss 0.0000833027 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
movsx 0.0013002940 0.0007457659 0.0000000000
movsxd 0.0012559968 0.0284969571 0.0001975253
movzx 0.0224119768 0.0019835049 0.0121157674
mul 0.0000000000 0.0000918937 0.0000000000
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table E.2 – Continued
HMM Parameters
mulsd 0.0000576711 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
mulss 0.0001025264 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
neg 0.0004132444 0.0003309115 0.0004780444
nop 0.0487322115 0.0008141748 0.0000000000
not 0.0001655860 0.0010675424 0.0031316466
or 0.0051077514 0.0014539539 0.0065058417
out 0.0000000000 0.0000306312 0.0000000000
pop 0.0364064838 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
push 0.0335773960 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
rep 0.0002909919 0.0012972864 0.0020672262
repnz 0.0000000000 0.0008088005 0.0002904841
repz 0.0017800704 0.0000000000 0.0076519334
ret 0.0200243835 0.0000002422 0.0000000000
retf 0.0000000000 0.0000025526 0.0000000000
rex 0.0000030712 0.0000000000 0.0000466851
rol 0.0000042868 0.0005870880 0.0001578656
ror 0.0000031970 0.0003717528 0.0003623200
sar 0.0000170744 0.0023766679 0.0008963376
sbb 0.0007386885 0.0003763670 0.0000000000
seta 0.0007272966 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setae 0.0000160197 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setb 0.0006471979 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setbe 0.0000608750 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
sete 0.0028381179 0.0000413051 0.0000000000
setg 0.0001409738 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setge 0.0000512632 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setl 0.0000512632 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setle 0.0000384474 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setne 0.0027169496 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
sets 0.0000064079 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
shl 0.0002439713 0.0264287036 0.0020933850
shr 0.0004962522 0.0025269726 0.0085614955
sldt 0.0000032039 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
stmxcsr 0.0000032039 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
stos 0.0001597281 0.0000000000 0.0002327241
sub 0.0128469226 0.0288366179 0.0368650112
subsd 0.0000064079 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
subss 0.0000352434 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
test 0.0972783254 0.0000000000 0.0000000158
ucomisd 0.0000384474 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
ucomiss 0.0001762172 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
xchg 0.0043416162 0.0000916833 0.0000000000
xor 0.0259037597 0.0879810038 0.0060168932
xorpd 0.0000384474 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
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Table E.3: HMM matrices, N = 2 Worm-padding ratio: 3.0
HMM Parameters
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Table E.4: HMM matrices, N = 3 Worm-padding ratio: 3.0
HMM Parameters








adc 0.0000686927 0.0000000000 0.0000149139
add 0.0280699091 0.0174225388 0.1893056150
addsd 0.0002008214 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
addss 0.0001151770 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
and 0.0112359283 0.0138288670 0.0508137537
bsf 0.0000118130 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
bsr 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0000319014
bswap 0.0000000000 0.0000129127 0.0000000000
bt 0.0002333073 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
call 0.0325833308 0.1354266373 0.0023525599
cdqe 0.0002378837 0.0047539025 0.0049387804
clc 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0000119630
cld 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0000079753
cmova 0.0001009336 0.0000000000 0.0005256663
cmovae 0.0002628398 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cmovb 0.0003041854 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cmovbe 0.0003276320 0.0000281084 0.0000000000
cmove 0.0040670800 0.0000000010 0.0000073716
cmovg 0.0001792889 0.0000049308 0.0000000000
cmovge 0.0001269900 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cmovl 0.0000497627 0.0000046268 0.0000000000
cmovle 0.0001186605 0.0000000000 0.0000152347
cmovne 0.0021607049 0.0000588935 0.0000000000
cmovns 0.0001138984 0.0000012441 0.0000353103
cmovs 0.0001151770 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cmp 0.1443463177 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cpuid 0.0000336036 0.0000163412 0.0000120764
cvtsi2sd 0.0003248582 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cvtsi2ss 0.0002096812 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cvttsd2si 0.0000118130 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cvttss2si 0.0000679249 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cwde 0.0000000000 0.0000025685 0.0001108831
dec 0.0000485819 0.0000246204 0.0004949083
div 0.0003450119 0.0003707240 0.0005140745
divsd 0.0001033640 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
divss 0.0000088598 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
enter 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0000797534
fcmovnb 0.0000000000 0.0000023113 0.0000076803
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table E.4 – Continued
HMM Parameters
fild 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0000239260
fisttp 0.0000088875 0.0000000000 0.0000677530
fld 0.0000118130 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
fmul 0.0000000000 0.0000017796 0.0000325916
fstp 0.0000065920 0.0000000000 0.0000150251
fsub 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0000039877
fucomip 0.0000059065 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
fxch 0.0000059065 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
hlt 0.0000000000 0.0000730641 0.0000041878
icebp 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0000757657
idiv 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0002392601
imul 0.0006387832 0.0005153713 0.0019508906
in 0.0000123661 0.0000000000 0.0000750190
inc 0.0001379581 0.0000300376 0.0001089787
ja 0.0103688836 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jae 0.0059419521 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jb 0.0066684532 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jbe 0.0078527090 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
je 0.1415141447 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jg 0.0046100334 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jge 0.0013053394 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jl 0.0024571094 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jle 0.0078970079 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jmp 0.0221411910 0.0608761139 0.0486305594
jne 0.0822895390 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jnp 0.0000059065 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jns 0.0011172046 0.0000824689 0.0000095080
jo 0.0000025507 0.0000000000 0.0000244696
jp 0.0000147663 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
js 0.0044416529 0.0000000000 0.0000040482
lea 0.0207468819 0.0374799817 0.0167145260
leave 0.0000048021 0.0000000000 0.0011938042
lock 0.0000000000 0.0000041588 0.0001438256
lods 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0000039877
loop 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0000159507
loope 0.0001358498 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
loopne 0.0000020400 0.0000000000 0.0001408015
mov 0.2143872020 0.5913503857 0.2914029817
movabs 0.0008978493 0.0001832596 0.0006054355
movapd 0.0000738314 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
movaps 0.0027288090 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
movs 0.0000000000 0.0000602594 0.0000000000
movsd 0.0001029955 0.0005576681 0.0000000000
movss 0.0000767847 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
movsx 0.0019227582 0.0004187492 0.0007830236
movsxd 0.0019069202 0.0036603345 0.0406323382
movzx 0.0262046980 0.0025548983 0.0073121624
mul 0.0000280977 0.0000086801 0.0004005715
mulsd 0.0000915510 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table E.4 – Continued
HMM Parameters
mulss 0.0000945042 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
neg 0.0002366660 0.0005907692 0.0003802532
nop 0.0195140607 0.0202251175 0.0229434617
not 0.0004292780 0.0000000007 0.0030730658
or 0.0036517954 0.0013136726 0.0059697802
out 0.0000054794 0.0000000000 0.0000404534
pop 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0649671000
push 0.0006618863 0.0000000000 0.0606559482
rep 0.0005787808 0.0014835884 0.0000783925
repnz 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0015751292
repz 0.0059393660 0.0000000000 0.0002706657
ret 0.0002012314 0.0000000000 0.0331170357
retf 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0000039877
rex 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0000199383
rol 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0010766706
ror 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0007098050
sar 0.0000230304 0.0000793049 0.0041844685
sbb 0.0020508079 0.0000000000 0.0001219327
seta 0.0011724428 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setae 0.0000295326 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setb 0.0010484061 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setbe 0.0000502054 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
sete 0.0037831216 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setg 0.0001742421 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setge 0.0000354391 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setl 0.0000413456 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setle 0.0000265793 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setne 0.0027312174 0.0000000000 0.0000126987
sets 0.0000088598 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
shl 0.0004156036 0.0006030007 0.0448336949
shr 0.0022834459 0.0001579169 0.0064816637
sldt 0.0000029533 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
stos 0.0000513155 0.0000217031 0.0000420285
sub 0.0106269804 0.0145519773 0.0454590987
subsd 0.0000059065 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
subss 0.0000324858 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
test 0.1301007285 0.0000000000 0.0000904740
ucomisd 0.0000354391 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
ucomiss 0.0001624291 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
xchg 0.0026466208 0.0013329123 0.0016807297
xor 0.0161896499 0.0898088944 0.0423157229
xorpd 0.0000064034 0.0000147027 0.0000000000
74
Table E.5: HMM matrices, N = 2 Worm-padding ratio: 4.0
HMM Parameters
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Table E.6: HMM matrices, N = 3 Worm-padding ratio: 4.0
HMM Parameters








adc 0.0000768630 0.0000154039 0.0000008589
add 0.0219442537 0.0418087140 0.1391768850
addsd 0.0001499633 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
addss 0.0000592448 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
and 0.0056939193 0.0163670891 0.0457075428
bsf 0.0000000000 0.0000000080 0.0000097197
bsr 0.0000148112 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
bswap 0.0000000000 0.0000229204 0.0000105699
bt 0.0002314242 0.0000000000 0.0000000012
call 0.0080288331 0.0040484733 0.2803971111
cdqe 0.0002383820 0.0065649974 0.0022401434
clc 0.0000000000 0.0000062093 0.0000002920
cld 0.0000000000 0.0000041118 0.0000002368
cmova 0.0002314248 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cmovae 0.0001795857 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cmovb 0.0003573199 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cmovbe 0.0001314191 0.0000964306 0.0000026736
cmove 0.0030921788 0.0003939283 0.0000752610
cmovg 0.0001584909 0.0000240330 0.0000004247
cmovge 0.0000999755 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cmovl 0.0000486198 0.0000094885 0.0000009475
cmovle 0.0001271497 0.0000041919 0.0000011607
cmovne 0.0017783231 0.0002729279 0.0000310218
cmovns 0.0001012792 0.0000981419 0.0000009787
cmovs 0.0000588429 0.0000258632 0.0000003125
cmp 0.1218090644 0.0000000000 0.0000000003
cpuid 0.0000073423 0.0000095105 0.0000537751
cvtsi2sd 0.0002406818 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cvtsi2ss 0.0001036783 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cvttsd2si 0.0000074056 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cvttss2si 0.0000370280 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
cwde 0.0000000000 0.0000599484 0.0000029365
dec 0.0000000004 0.0002381938 0.0002023263
div 0.0000138980 0.0000022417 0.0014093084
divsd 0.0000765486 0.0000012175 0.0000002694
divss 0.0000074056 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
enter 0.0000000000 0.0000407058 0.0000029950
fcmovnb 0.0000000000 0.0000062804 0.0000001839
Continued on Next Page. . .
78
Table E.6 – Continued
HMM Parameters
fild 0.0000005389 0.0000011504 0.0000167704
fisttp 0.0000002058 0.0000051380 0.0000567070
fld 0.0000074056 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
fmul 0.0000000000 0.0000184894 0.0000010865
fstp 0.0000041018 0.0000074992 0.0000008759
fsub 0.0000018514 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
fucomip 0.0000037028 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
fxch 0.0000037028 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
hlt 0.0000000000 0.0000787735 0.0000456841
icebp 0.0000000000 0.0000391792 0.0000020718
idiv 0.0000000000 0.0000063730 0.0002887542
imul 0.0006122794 0.0017069258 0.0011072843
in 0.0000088156 0.0000369855 0.0000029363
inc 0.0000978800 0.0000107109 0.0002825873
ja 0.0071982375 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jae 0.0044896415 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jb 0.0044266939 0.0000000001 0.0000000000
jbe 0.0060337079 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
je 0.1196614145 0.0000000316 0.0000000005
jg 0.0038620174 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jge 0.0012977429 0.0000001003 0.0000000009
jl 0.0018939807 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jle 0.0063077547 0.0000127123 0.0000000677
jmp 0.0644172341 0.0134160245 0.0715801504
jne 0.0695847451 0.0000000782 0.0000000024
jnp 0.0000037028 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
jns 0.0007647518 0.0003380045 0.0000049546
jo 0.0000001955 0.0000142735 0.0000006654
jp 0.0000111084 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
js 0.0031610721 0.0000264531 0.0000006679
ldmxcsr 0.0000092570 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
lea 0.0163598218 0.0486691714 0.0143699143
leave 0.0004008389 0.0000010553 0.0002951972
lock 0.0000006591 0.0000008555 0.0001208145
lods 0.0000000000 0.0000020111 0.0000001866
loop 0.0000000000 0.0000084117 0.0000001877
loope 0.0000002271 0.0000000000 0.0001488236
loopne 0.0000000000 0.0000641447 0.0000192646
mov 0.1835068386 0.6817903164 0.3080046846
movabs 0.0006096951 0.0002853643 0.0005383271
movapd 0.0000555396 0.0000000027 0.0000000000
movaps 0.0028141258 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
movs 0.0000000000 0.0001099191 0.0000307737
movsd 0.0000677987 0.0005323671 0.0003110500
movss 0.0000555420 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
movsx 0.0019932330 0.0006513406 0.0005616580
movsxd 0.0011773337 0.0251075494 0.0063304003
movzx 0.0252138044 0.0017584942 0.0054858204
mul 0.0000000000 0.0001081539 0.0000075057
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Table E.6 – Continued
HMM Parameters
mulsd 0.0000591981 0.0000000356 0.0000000277
mulss 0.0000444336 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
neg 0.0000958148 0.0003869207 0.0008204500
nop 0.0448083873 0.0111497760 0.0015285884
not 0.0001164287 0.0011825577 0.0027570567
or 0.0043755194 0.0019436983 0.0056111448
out 0.0000000007 0.0000242027 0.0000021314
pop 0.0396439971 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
push 0.0402901351 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
rep 0.0003720701 0.0012545017 0.0009346186
repnz 0.0000000000 0.0010618879 0.0003806675
repz 0.0051787613 0.0000000000 0.0000025438
ret 0.0204153817 0.0001521154 0.0004823938
retf 0.0000000000 0.0000020846 0.0000000748
rex 0.0000000000 0.0000001596 0.0000159770
rol 0.0000000000 0.0012890875 0.0001617761
ror 0.0000000000 0.0002182096 0.0002489281
sar 0.0000000000 0.0025773822 0.0011779151
sbb 0.0009545611 0.0008967517 0.0000037268
seta 0.0009942010 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setae 0.0000333252 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setb 0.0009312535 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setbe 0.0000499878 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
sete 0.0034602637 0.0000000002 0.0000000000
setg 0.0002314230 0.0000000021 0.0000000000
setge 0.0000443831 0.0000000573 0.0000000013
setl 0.0001147867 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setle 0.0000370280 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
setne 0.0028010475 0.0000001220 0.0000000220
sets 0.0000074056 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
shl 0.0000000080 0.0219096285 0.0064945917
shr 0.0006075657 0.0012384284 0.0066612662
sldt 0.0000018514 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
stmxcsr 0.0000092570 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
stos 0.0000570179 0.0000700050 0.0000466967
sub 0.0114616550 0.0201788585 0.0366383704
subsd 0.0000037028 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
subss 0.0000185140 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
test 0.1089427232 0.0000000001 0.0000471196
ucomisd 0.0000259196 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
ucomiss 0.0001055297 0.0000000000 0.0000000000
xchg 0.0041833547 0.0006868617 0.0001250157
xor 0.0182797050 0.0888314225 0.0569142674
xorpd 0.0000188458 0.0000161514 0.0000008157
80
